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Research Proposal 
“Analysis of the effect of board composition in FTSE 100 on the companies’ performance in 
risk management during the ongoing financial crisis” 
Introduction 
The Board of directors is the highest body of corporate governance and over the years has been 
subject to much research. Research on boards has concentrated at identifying attributes of the 
board which would make it as efficient as possible. One of the main attributes of the board of 
directors is its composition implying the proportion of non-executive directors over executive ones. 
The results of research examining the link between board composition and firm’s performance 
have so far been rather equivocal and therefore further research is needed. 
The ongoing financial crisis as well as preceding high-profile corporate scandals draw significant 
attention to boards of directors and provoked a great number of debates over their role, structure, 
attributes, the way they treat their responsibilities and regulation on boards among other aspects. 
In this light the issue of board effectiveness as an institution and its role in a company’s 
performance becomes even more.  
Background 
Over the time different approaches of studying boards have developed. The traditional approach 
has been based on the agency theory with researchers trying to find a direct link between board 
attributes and firm’s performance. Agency theory is derived from the agency problem which exists 
when ownership and control in a company are separated and when independent governing body is 
needed in order to ensure that the management of the organization works in the best interest of 
shareholders (Zahra and Pearce 1989, Hermalin and Weisbach 2003, Shleifer and Vishny 2003). 
Agency theorists argue that boards with higher number of non-executive directors are more 
effective in serving their role in the company, which they define as control and monitoring (for a 
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literature review see Hermalin and Wesibach 2003, Daily and Dalton 2003). So far the results of 
studies based on this approach have been rather equivocal, failing to establish a strong relationship. 
As a result, a different view on the board of directors has been proposed. Since the search for direct 
relationship had not led to consistent results several scholars came to a conclusion that there must 
be some link between board attributes and firm’s performance. Forbes and Milliken (1999) argued 
that boards should be looked at as decision-making groups, and that processes which occur within 
any group and obviously affect its performance should be therefore studied as they probably are 
the missing link in the board attributes/firm’s performance relationship. 
Recent literature reviews indicate that studying boards from a traditional theoretical perspective 
has not led to a strong evidence of the fact that relationship between board composition and firm 
performance exists (Lynall, Golden and Hillman 2003; Daily and Dalton 2003, Macus 2008, 
Hermalin and Weisbach 2003, Johnson et al. 1996). However, there is evidence that boards with 
different composition make different decisions (Dahya and McConnell 2003). Due to the fact that 
decisions regarding risk management are one of the key decisions the board is responsible for and 
also the lack of study on the particular matter, research trying to explore the relationship between 
the board composition and risk management is needed. 
Research Question 
The question for this proposed research is whether or not board composition, as measured by the 
number of executive directors over non-executive directors, affects the performance in risk 
management among FTSE 100 listed companies in the London Stock Exchange during the ongoing 
global financial crisis, and the hypothesis is that Companies with higher proportion of non-
executive directors over executive directors will see a lower increase or a higher decrease in beta 
values.  
Methodology 
FTSE 100 comprises the population for this study. The companies will be divided into three groups 
for the purposes of the study: (1) companies without changes in board composition over the last 12 
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month, (2) companies with such changes, (3) companies with such changes where the proportion of 
outside directors over inside ones decreasing as a result in board. Such division would allow 
studying all companies of the FTSE 100 and draw stronger conclusions about the studied 
relationship. 
Market-based beta has been chosen as a proxy for measuring companies’ performance in risk 
management for the purposes of this study. There are several reasons for choosing beta as a proxy. 
Firstly, it is a market-based measure of financial performance. Secondly, it is widely accepted as a 
measure for assessing a company’s success in managing systematic risk. 
The proposed research is going to utilize secondary data sources: published beta values for FTSE 
100 available at the London Stock Exchange web site for the year 2008 and Yahoo! Finance for the 
current figure as well the board reports for the companies available at Hemscott official website for 
the purpose of identifying board composition and changes in the board composition for the last 12 
month. The research is going to be of quantitative character and study correlation between board 
composition and beta values. SPSS will be used for working with numerical data. 
Main limitations of the proposed research are the allowed time frame and impossibility to access 
boards of directors which both make it infeasible to undertake primary research which in other 
case could have been complementary in studying boards more thoroughly. 
Timescale 
February 2010: 
 Consultation with the supervisor 
 Collection of data from previously identified secondary data sources. 
 Division of the population into three sub-groups. 
March 2010: 
 Development of the SPSS model for the statistical analysis of the data 
 Implementation of the analysis according to the research design. 
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 Consultation with the supervisor. 
 Drafting the “Results” section of the dissertation addressing the research question. 
April 2010: 
 Consultation with the supervisor 
 Writing the “Conclusions and Recommendations” section of the dissertation and completion 
of the draft. 
 Consultations with the supervisor. 
 Reviewing the draft and writing the final. 
7th May 2010: 
 Submission of the dissertation. 
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Abstract 
In this research the author examines the relationship between the change in board composition of 
the companies included in the FTSE 100 index of London Stock Exchange and its impact on the 
effectiveness of the boards’ decisions regarding risk management reflected by the change in 
market-based beta. 
The results of this study have identified no significant correlation between change in board 
composition for the companies in the index overall, but has found the presence of a significant 
negative relationship between the variables in the companies, whose boards’ composition has 
changed in a way that the proportion of non-executive directors decreased between. The author 
discusses the implications of these findings in the context of existing research of the relationship 
between board composition and board decisions. 
The study analysed the relationship between 2007 and 2010, assuming that the recent financial 
crisis has increased investors’ attention to the way the companies are governed and subsequently 
in an increased activity of non-executive directors.  
1. Introduction 
Today the issue of corporate governance is more important than ever. Recent global financial crisis 
and preceding corporate scandals such as Enron, WorldCom and Adelphia (CNN Money 2002), to 
name a few, have drawn significant attention to public companies, and the way they are governed 
in particular, as some of the industry analysts call unchallenged executive decisions as one of the 
major reasons of the global financial collapse (Brockett 2009). Boards of directors, as companies’ 
highest governing bodies with primary aim of monitoring companies’ management, have attracted 
special attention. 
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1.1. Statement of the problem 
Over years boards of directors have provoked considerable amount of research trying to identify 
which set of board characteristics would have the most positive impact on board performance. The 
relationship between board composition and firm performance has been of special interest for 
researchers but the results of studying this relationship so far have been rather equivocal. The 
current attention devoted to the subject of boards has established a new string of debates over 
their role, structure, attributes, the way boards treat their responsibilities and regulation on boards 
among other issues. In other words, the issue of board effectiveness as an institution and its role in 
a company’s performance becomes even more relevant to various stakeholders of the companies 
these boards govern (Boasack & Blinka, 2010). 
Poor corporate risk management practices have been identified as one of the key reasons of the 
recent financial crisis (Preimesberger, 2008). Although, the management of risk is the task of a 
company’s management, it is board of directors that holds responsibility for the oversight of risk 
management strategy development and implementation in the company it governs (Lipton et al, 
2008). It is also the responsibility of the board to effectively take decisions which objectively 
serve the interests of the company and its shareholders (Financial Reporting Council, 
2008), which includes making sure that the risk management strategy is designed and 
implemented accordingly, as recommended by the Combined Code of Corporate Governance 2008 
which serves as a guidance for boards of the companies listed on London Stock Exchange. 
Linking the obvious flows in companies’ risk management in the past and boards’ fulfillment of 
their duties, it has been observed that in numerous organizations boards have traditionally been 
passive in performing their functions which many argue could had led to excessive managerial 
control and subsequently to a string of corporate scandals and global financial crisis (Reynolds, 
2008). The realization of the need for major changes in the board regulation led to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 which among other issues included board-composition rules. 
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The problem this study aims to address is, therefore, the relationship of board composition and 
corporate risk management performance. It was only logical to assume that an increased level of 
monitoring of boards by various stakeholders has caused boards to perform their functions, 
including risk management oversight, with more responsibility, which could potentially have a 
positive effect on companies’ performance. 
1.2. Purpose 
The goal of the proposed study is therefore to contribute to the existent body of knowledge of the 
board of directors and further explore the presence of the relationship between board composition 
and firm performance, especially in the light of the current developments. In particular, the study 
concentrates on examining whether the proportion of outside directors in the board has an 
influence on companies’ performance in risk management. 
1.3. Significance of the study 
The findings of this research contribute to the empirical theory on boards that can assist 
practitioners in their decisions. The relationship, if established, would be another step towards 
understanding the way boards of directors affect firms’ performance as well as contributing to 
developing stronger and more consistent evidence on the fact that board composition and firm 
performance are indeed correlated. It can also serve as a point for further, deeper investigation on 
the way board composition and performance in risk management are correlated and therefore 
encourage more research on the subject. 
In case the relationship is not established, the research will be yet another piece of evidence in 
support of the hypothesis of non-existent straightforward relationship between the board 
composition and firm performance. This, in turn, will encourage some researchers to try other ways 
to prove that the relationship exists and add confidence to those who are in favor of alternative 
methods of exploring this issue. 
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1.4. Research question 
The research question this study aims to explore is weather the changes in board composition, as 
measured by the number of executive directors over non-executive directors, in between 2007 and 
2010 affected the performance in risk management as measured by market-based beta among the 
companies listed in London Stock Exchange FTSE 100. 
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2. Background 
2.1. Literature Review 
a. Introduction to corporate governance and boards of directors 
Corporate governance has always been an important part of finance research. This can be explained 
by the importance of the role that corporate governance plays and the number of stakeholders it 
has direct or indirect impact on. For years, scholars have tried to identify the most effective 
organisation of corporate governance.  supported by the fact that nowadays most countries in the 
world have their own corporate governance codes and are placing more emphasis on improving 
corporate governance (Centre for Corporate Governance Research, 2008). More and more 
companies adopt codes of best practice and implement various steps at improving corporate 
governance systems to increase investor confidence and decrease a chance of fraud in the future 
(Centre for Corporate Governance Research, 2007). 
The study of corporate governance is complicated by the fact that the structure, role and impact of 
boards have been studied from a variety of theoretical perspectives, which in turn have resulted in 
a number of sometimes competing theories concerning corporate governance (Kiel & Nicholson, 
2003). The literature review presented below gives greater insight in these theories and 
approaches and leads to the justification of hypothesis. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) identify corporate governance mechanisms as “economic and legal 
institutions that can be altered through the political process – sometimes for the better” and 
present a point of view that there is no need to worry about governance reform since “in the long 
run, product market competition would force firms to minimize costs, and as part of this cost 
minimization to adopt rules, including corporate governance mechanisms, enabling them to raise 
external capital at the lowest cost”. 
One of the main mechanisms of corporate governance system is a board of directors. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003) in their survey of economic literature on boards of directors define the board as 
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“an economic institution that, in theory, helps to solve agency problems inherent in managing an 
organization” (p. 7). As an important mechanism of corporate governance system and in 
accordance with the definition by Shleifer and Vishny described earlier, a board of directors is one 
of the legal requirements for the majority of incorporations to exist and have seen many changes 
and reforms in attempting to improve their work and effectiveness. 
The effectiveness of the board of directors as a corporate governance tool is a subject to much 
debate. On the one hand the ownership and control are separated which creates an agency problem 
that leads to potential self-motivated behavior of companies’ managers and, as a result, harms 
shareholders. On the other hand, however, laws of many countries require firms to have them. 
Addressing this issue, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) point out that although boards as a solution 
may not be perfect, they had existed long before their presence was required by law, and their size 
is also generally larger than it is required by law. They also assure the point of view of Shleifer and 
Vishny that were the boards simply a product of regulation and representing only a cost for a 
company, they would be most likely eliminated in the market conditions over the time of their 
existence. They conclude by defining boards as “a market solution to an organizational design 
problem, an endogenously determined institution that helps to ameliorate the agency problems 
that plague any large organization” (Hermalin and Wesibach 2003, p. 9). 
Given the high importance of the role that boards play in corporate governance today there is no 
surprise that they are paid enormous attention in the corporate governance research. 
These contradictions and lack of clarity and theoretical support on the rela effectiveness of boards 
as a core mechanism of corporate governance led numerous scholars to concentrate their efforts on 
studying the various board characteristics and their relationship with firm’s performance. 
Over time the research on boards has taken different approaches such as theoretic approach based 
on different theories which describe different roles the board plays in the company, group 
processes approach based on studying boards as work groups which activity and performance are 
highly influenced by the processes within the group, and the approach of integrating the two 
previous approaches together. Each of the approaches is described below in more detail. 
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b. Introduction to corporate governance and boards of directors 
Corporate governance has always been an important part of finance research. This can be expalined 
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a number of sometimes competing theories concerning corporate governance (Kiel & Nicholson, 
2003). The literature review presented below gives greater insight in these theories and 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1997) identify corporate governance mechanisms as “economic and legal 
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present a point of view that there is no need to worry about governance reform since “in the long 
run, product market competition would force firms to minimize costs, and as part of this cost 
minimization to adopt rules, including corporate governance mechanisms, enabling them to raise 
external capital at the lowest cost”. 
One of the main mechanisms of corporate governance system is a board of directors. Hermalin and 
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of the legal requirements for the majority of incorporations to exist and have seen many changes 
and reforms in attempting to improve their work and effectiveness. 
The effectiveness of the board of directors as a corporate governance tool is a subject to much 
debate. On the one hand the ownership and control are separated which creates an agency problem 
that leads to potential self-motivated behavior of companies’ managers and, as a result, harms 
shareholders. On the other hand, however, laws of many countries require firms to have them. 
Addressing this issue, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) point out that although boards as a solution 
may not be perfect, they had existed long before their presence was required by law, and their size 
is also generally larger than it is required by law. They also assure the point of view of Shleifer and 
Vishny that were the boards simply a product of regulation and representing only a cost for a 
company, they would be most likely eliminated in the market conditions over the time of their 
existence. They conclude by defining boards as “a market solution to an organizational design 
problem, an endogenously determined institution that helps to ameliorate the agency problems 
that plague any large organization” (Hermalin and Wesibach 2003, p. 9). 
Given the high importance of the role that boards play in corporate governance today there is no 
surprise that they are paid enormous attention in the corporate governance research. 
These contradictions and lack of clarity and theoretical support on the rela effectiveness of boards 
as a core mechanism of corporate governance led numerous scholars to concentrate their efforts on 
studying the various board characteristics and their relationship with firm’s performance. 
Over time the research on boards has taken different approaches such as theoretic approach based 
on different theories which describe different roles the board plays in the company, group 
processes approach based on studying boards as work groups which activity and performance are 
highly influenced by the processes within the group, and the approach of integrating the two 
previous approaches together. Each of the approaches is described below in more detail. 
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c. Theoretic approach to examining boards 
For the years researchers from different disciplines such as finance, economics, law, strategic 
management and sociology have studied corporate governance in attempt to explain various roles 
of boards and determine characteristics of the most efficient board (Kiel & Nicholson 2003). As a 
result different theoretical perspectives of studying corporate governance have emerged. Three 
most dominant theories are agency theory, stewardship theory and resource dependence theory 
with agency theory being the dominant one (Hermalin and Weisbach 2000). Through these theories 
scholars tried to explain different roles of boards and how board attributes such as composition or 
size influence the way boards serve their roles and therefore having a direct impact on firm’s 
performance (Johnson et al. 1996, Lynall et al. 2003, Daily et al. 2003). Agency theory, stewardship 
theory and resource dependence theory and their implication to board research are described 
below. 
Most of the existent research on the boards of directors is based on agency theory which is only 
concerned with the monitoring role of directors. Many scholars have identified other significant 
roles that boards of directors serve such as resource, service, and strategy roles. This limitation of 
the agency theory makes researchers consider other theoretical foundations. An important aspect 
of broadening the focus beyond directors’ monitoring role is considering theoretical foundations 
other than agency theory (Dalton et al 2003; Dalton et al 1998; Lane et al 1998). 
i) Agency theory  
Agency theory has been the dominant theory in corporate governance research (Hermalin and 
Weisbach 2000). The theory is rather straightforward and explains agency problem which occurs 
when ownership and control are separated which nowadays occurs in the absolute majority of 
public companies. According to the perspective of agency theorists the main purpose of the board 
of directors is to solve the agency problem. In order to analyze boards, it is therefore important to 
first examine the agency problem and the way it affects the system of corporate governance in 
today business as well as look at the results of past governance research based on agency theory. 
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Agency problem has been an important issue for economists for a very long time. Adam Smith 
(1776) addressed agency problem and boards of directors in his work: “The directors of [joint 
stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of the people’s money than of their own, it 
cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance [as owners] 
. . . . Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of 
the affairs of such a company (p. 700).” 
As it is clear from the Smith’s definition agency theory, separation of ownership and control in 
modern corporations is the ultimate reason behind the agency problem. It is argued that such 
characteristic of a modern firm is likely to lead to managers exploiting their power and control of 
the firms entrusted to them by the shareholders in order to achieve personal gain, even at the cost 
of the interests of the people whose interests they – managers – are there to represent. The reason 
it is possible is because managers have all the knowledge and expertise relevant to the companies’ 
operations while owners are largely unaware of their companies’ business routines or do not hold 
the knowledge necessary to be involved actively in their firms business. 
There has been a lot of effort over the years aimed at reduction of the agency problem in order to 
ensure that management works in an interest of shareholders. Various regulations have been 
imposed on the boards of directors as well as different measures on how to encourage management 
to serve their duties and not taking advantage of their control power. One of such measures is the 
inclusion of the outside directors in the governing board with primary task (from the agency 
perspective) to monitor the work of inside directors (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). 
The most widely accepted solution for the agency problem is the creation of a governing body 
which would monitor firms’ managers on behalf of the owners. This governing body is known as 
board of directors. This view is accepted by numerous researchers. In their overview of corporate 
governance Shleifer and Vishny (2003) point out that the agency problem in the organizations 
“necessitates monitoring mechanisms designed to protect shareholders as owners of the firm” hand 
that one of the board of directors’ main purposes is to “serve this monitoring function”. Hermalin 
and Weisbach (2003) also recognize the board of directors as “an economic institution that, in 
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theory, helps to solve the agency problems inherent in managing an organization”. Dalton et al., 
(not sure) in the study identify the board of directors as “a mechanism to protect shareholders from 
managerial self-interest”. 
However, the effectiveness of the board of directors as a solution of the agency problem is still an 
open question. In their review Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) mention that “formal economic 
theory on boards to date has been quite limited” and that “The characteristics of agency problems 
that could lead to boards being the equilibrium solution have not yet been specified”. 
The main purpose of boards of directors is frequently identified as maximizing shareholder value 
(find references). Some scholars, however, argue that rather than concentrating their work 
exclusively on maximizing shareholders’ wealth, boards of directors are in fact a balancing force 
between various interests of multiple stakeholders of public firms (Dalton et al., Blair and Stout). 
With the reference to the work of Bosch (1999) as well as reports by Committee on the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) and OECD (1999), Kiel & Nicholson (2003) conclude that 
agency theory dictates that the majority of directors on the board have to be non-executive and, 
ideally, independent. Boards with the domination of outside directors are also recommended by the 
Combined Code of Corporate Governance (Financial Reporting Council 2008). According to 
Surname non-executive or “non-management directors are believed to provide superior 
performance benefits to the firm as a result of their independence from firm management”. This 
view is supported by several empirical studies on boards identified in the work of Surname. The 
authors also indicate that only isolated studies provide empirical evidence in support of higher 
effectiveness of outsider-dominated boards (Kiel & Nicholson 2003). Past research has indicated 
that outside directors were positively associated with profitability among a sample of U.K. firms, 
that firms with outside dominated boards enjoyed higher return on equity and positive relationship 
between the higher number of outside directors in the board and firm performance in general (find 
out about the use of references here).  
The majority of the studies, however, have not found a strong relationship. A meta-analysis based 
on 159 samples of board composition and its relationship with firm performance (Dalton, Daily 
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Ellstrand and Johnson 1998) has not established any significant relationship. The results of 
Rhoades, Rechner and Sundaramurthy (2000) based on a similar analysis based on 37 samples 
have shown a very small relationship between the proportion of outside directors and firm 
performance. In their study of Australian firms Kiel and Nicholson (2003) have found that the 
proportion of outside directors has a significant correlation with the market-based measure of 
performance, but no significant correlation with the accounting-based measure. All in all however, 
there is a lack of consistent evidence in support of significant relationship between board 
compoaition and firm performance (Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand 1999, Dalton et al 1998, 
Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand 1996, Kiel and Nicholson 2003). 
ii) Stewardship theory 
An alternative theory to the agency theory is stewardship theory. It is based on the idea that the 
domination of insider directors in the board demography makes the board more effective. The 
theory argues that the firms’ managers are reliable stewards of the firms entrusted to the by 
shareholders and do not make a selfish use of the companies’ resources (reference). 
Researchers have identified several benefits of inside directors. Firstly, there is obvious advantage 
that inside directors have over outside directors — extensive and deep firm specific information 
that would allow them to perform a better control over the firm’s top managers. Secondly, several 
empirical studies have reported a positive relationship between inside directors and corporate 
R&D spending, the nature and degree of diversification, and CEO compensation. Thirdly, inside 
directors have been associated with higher firm performance in general. For example, a positive 
and significant relationship between the proportion of inside directors and returns to investors has 
been established. 
iii) Resource dependence theory 
Resource dependence theory argues that firm depends on external environment and its players. In 
this perspective boards are viewed as a means to manage this dependency and help a firm extract a 
maximum gain from its external environment (Macus 2008). Lynall et al. (2003) listed four 
22 
 
different types of resources which a board can provide. They are: advice and counsel, legitimacy, 
channels for communicating information between the firm and external organizations, and 
assistance in obtaining resources or commitments from important elements outside the firm. It is 
also argued that board members will be chosen based on the resources that they can bring to the 
company. Daily and Dalton (2003) noted that outside directors can significantly reduce a firm’s cost 
and enhance organizational functioning and performance. Helping a company to gain useful links 
with organization within its external environment, favorable relationships with financial 
institutions or legal advice, depending on the outside director and their primary job, can serve as 
examples.  
b) Alternative perspective on studying boards 
As it has been stated above board of directors has been an important part of the corporate 
governance research and finding the relationship between the board attributes and firm 
performance has always been of prime interest for researchers. Surprisingly, after many years of 
scientific work the relationship has not been established. Many scholars in there review of the 
existent research on boards discussed the reasons for such weak results and proposed there view 
on the direction the future research on boards should take (Forbes and Milliken 1999, Macus 2008, 
Dalton et al. 2003, Hillman and Dalziel 2003, Lynall et al. 2003). 
In recent years, it has been argued that unitheoretic approach to studying boards (research based 
on a single theory such as agency theory, e.g.) does not capture all the roles of the boards and 
therefore has serious limitations. In their studies attempted to integrate several theories into 
multitheoretic approach to studying boards. This approach is also reviewed in the following 
section. 
Several researchers argue that the reason why the results of research on boards have been rather 
equivocal is the fact that scholars concentrate their study of boards based on a single theory only, 
e.g. agency theory, and suggest that multitheoretic approach to studying the relationship between 
board tasks and firm performance would be more fruitful (Lynall, Golden and Hillman 2003; Daily 
and Dalton 2003, Macus 2008, Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). 
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Daily and Dalton (2003) come to a conclusion that different theoretical perspectives on studying 
boards should be viewed as complementary and not as substitutes to the dominant agency theory. 
They argue that multi-theoretic approach would likely lead to a deeper understanding of what 
makes boards more effective in serving their multiple tasks. This view is enforced by Lynall, Golden 
and Hillman (2003) who agree that it is not worth arguing which theory is more useful in 
understanding what makes different kinds of board composition more or less effective and suggest 
that different theories can explain or predict the board composition in different stages of the 
organizational life cycle. 
Another emerging perspective on studying boards is looking at them as a small group of people or a 
team working together in order to achieve certain goals and studying processes that occur within 
this group and influence its effectiveness (Forbes & Milliken, 1999).  In their work researchers 
present a comprehensive analysis of the boards of directors from this perspective. Defining the 
reasoning behind the need for boards they establish a high importance of the fact that the essential 
quality of boards is the fact that they are in groups of individuals working together. According to 
the researchers “the very existence of the board as an institution is rooted in the wise belief that the 
effective oversight of an organization exceeds the capabilities of any individual and that collective 
knowledge and deliberation are better suited to this task.” (Forbes & Milliken, 1999) 
Discussing further they refer to the board’s tasks of control and service and establish that those “to 
be performed effectively, require that board members cooperate to exchange information, evaluate 
the merits of competing alternatives, and reach well-reasoned decisions”. 
The issue of whether it is worth studying board processes caused a debate among the researchers. 
Some argue that studying the processes within boards to understand how they impact board 
effectiveness and its impact on firm performance is not necessary for one simple reason that since 
the relationship between board attributes and firm performance can be established based on the 
existent governance theories and input/output approach there is no need of studying processes as 
a link between board attributes and firm performance (Pfeffer 1983). 
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However, the results of the input/output research practiced by scholars trying to find the 
relationship based on agency theory, for example, have been equivocal and are yet to establish a 
significant link between board attributes and organizational performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
Dalton et al. 1998, Zahra and Pearce 1989). Another argument in support of the need to study 
board processes in studying boards is that in the majority of the research based on the 
input/output approach the possible impact of processes has not actually been studied (Forbes and 
Milliken 1999). Furthermore, there is evidence in the research of group dynamics that 
understanding processes within groups play an important role in understanding of group dynamics 
and that a even a single group characteristic can have multiple effects on group performance 
(Forbes and Milliken 1999). 
Developing their model of board processes the authors identified criteria which they argued to be 
determinants of board effectiveness with the first one being board task performance which 
measures boards ability to perform its control and service tasks effectively and the second one 
being board’s ability of working together at a continuous basis or in other words cohesiveness of 
the board. They concluded that “the effectiveness of boards is likely to depend heavily on social-
psychological processes, particularly those pertaining to group participation and interaction, the 
exchange of information, and critical discussion” (Forbes and Milliken 2003, p. 492). Huse and 
Zattoni (2008) note that developing the research of boards from a behavioural perspective, the 
need of which was established by Forbes and Milliken (1999) is a challenge.  
An emerging perspective on the research of boards is studying boards as decision-making groups 
and analyzing how group behavior within boards affects their performance (Forbes and Milliken 
1999, Huse and Zattoni 2008, Finkelstein and Mooney 2003, Letendre 2004, Huse 2007). Huse and 
Zattoni (2008) that the treatment of a board as “black box” and simply compare its demographic 
variables with various indicators of firm performance, assuming that particular demographic 
variables such as board composition or structure  cause particular board behavior, does not seem 
promising. Forbes and Milliken (1999) establish the need for deeper exploration of intervening 
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processes such as interactions, trust, leadership, working style, task performance, trust, etc. within 
boards that might have significant impact on their behavior. 
In his work on board capability Macus (2008) argues that isolation of different perspectives on 
board research has been the main problem preventing researchers from finally understanding what 
makes board effective. On the one hand, there is multitheoretic research on boards which focuses 
on the study of one board task derived from a single theory as it is in a case of the board’s control 
and monitoring role derived from the agency theory. On the other hand there is research on board 
processes which are believed to be the missing link preventing the input-output research from 
succeeding (Forbes and Milliken 1999). Macus (2008) argues that in order to truly understand how 
boards work and explain the relationship between the board and firm performance researchers 
should pay attention to interaction within boards, something he believes is a crucial link between 
board’s roles and processes. 
Taking into consideration all of the above described perspectives on studying boards, it can be 
concluded that the search for the ideal characteristics of boards of directors should concentrate on 
“opening” the “black box” that is a board of directors and analyse them from the perspective of 
group processes and behaviour.  
2.2. Justification of Hypothesis 
As it is clear from the above review of the literature on boards the empirical evidence on the 
relationship between the board composition and firm performance is quite equivocal. However, 
there is a lot of evidence that boards with different composition make different decisions (Dahya & 
McConnell, 2005, Uzun, Szewczyk & Varma, 2004, Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990). Due to the fact that 
decisions regarding risk management are one of the key decisions the board is responsible for and 
also the lack of study on the particular matter, research trying to explore the relationship between 
the board composition and risk management is needed. 
Furthermore, it has noted that the possible reasons behind the research on boards from the agency 
perspective failing to produce strong evidence for the existent relationship between board 
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composition and firm performance are their passiveness or little involvement in their duties. 
Taking their argument into account, it seems to be especially attractive to study boards now since 
the ongoing financial crisis as well as preceding high-profile corporate scandals, boards attracted 
much attention and debate over their effectiveness and the way they perform their responsibilities. 
 Besides, new regulations have increased accountability of board members, including non-executive 
directors. Since boards became much more monitored by both investors, mass media and public 
eye, it is logical to assume that members of the board began treating their responsibilities much 
more seriously which logically leads to an assumption that if the link between board composition 
and firm performance exists, it will be stronger in times when boards of directors fulfill their duties 
with higher degree of responsibility and devotion. Additionally, past research in numerous cases 
succeeded in establishing links between board composition and market-based performance 
measures (Kiel and Nicholson 2003). 
According an agency theory perspective and the existing evidence that board composition in many 
cases has a significant effect on board decisions the hypotheses for this study will be: 
Hypothesis (1): The change in board composition, in either direction has an impact on the 
effectiveness of board’s decisions regarding risk management, reflected by the change in the 
market-based beta. 
Hypothesis (2): An increase in the proportion of non-executive directors in the companies’ boards 
would result in the decrease in the company’s Beta. 
Hypothesis (3): A decrease in the proportion of non-executive directors in the companies’ boards 
would result in an increase in the companies’ beta. 
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3. Methodology 
The companies which were listed in the FTSE 100 index of London Stock Exchange (London Stock 
Exchange, 2010) in both 2007 and 2010 comprise the population for this study. This is needed in 
order to be able to assess the change in board composition and beta in the studied companies. 
The study will compare the companies in the index in terms of change in board composition and 
beta ratio for 2007 and 2010. For the purposes of the study the whole population will be divided 
into three groups. One group would consist of companies which did not have changes in the board 
composition over the last 12 month. The second group would include all the companies where the 
changes in board composition led to the increased proportion of outside directors over inside ones. 
The third group of companies would be comprised of the companies which had changes in board 
composition with the result of decreased proportion of outside directors over inside directors. It 
should be noted that board composition changes are determined based on the proportion of 
executive directors over non-executive directors and not on the change of the actual number of 
directors in the board. Thus a company with 3 executive and 6 nonexecutive directors in 2007 and 
5 executive director and 10 non-executive directors in 2010 will be considered as the one with no 
change in board composition. 
Such clustering of companies would allow studying all companies of the FTSE 100 and draw 
stronger conclusions about the relationship between board composition and firm performance. In 
case of the relationship between board composition in the companies from the first group and their 
performance in risk management is established it is likely that the examinations of the companies 
from the second and the third groups are going to lead to even stronger evidence of the 
relationship. 
There are two types of performance measures that researchers use to assess firm’s performance. 
They are accounting-based and market-based performance measures. In their research scholars 
may use either one of them or a combination of both (Daily et al). Daily identifies five main 
disadvantages of the accounting-based measures of financial performance. Firstly, they can be 
28 
 
manipulated. Secondly, they may undervalue assets. Thirdly, they might create distortions due to 
the nature of depreciation policies elected, inventory valuation, and treatment of certain revenue 
and expenditure items. Fourthly, they might differ in methods adopted for consolidation of 
accounts. And fifthly, they lack standardization in the handling of international accounting 
conventions. She also notes that “financial accounting measures do not normally account for 
shareholder risk” which means that the application of accounting performance measures would not 
be useful for this particular study. Market-based returns on the other hand do reflect risk-adjusted 
performance and since market-based beta coefficient is a widely accepted market-based measure 
for assessing company’s systematic risk and conclusions on companies’ performance in risk 
management can be drawn from it. For these reasons beta has been chosen as a proxy for 
measuring the companies’ performance in risk management for the purposes of this study. 
The proposed research is aimed at identifying the presence of the link between board composition 
and firm’s performance in risk management. 
The proposed research is going to utilize secondary data sources: published beta values for the 
companies listed in FTSE 100 Index of LSE for the years 2007 and 2010 are published at ADVFN 
(ADVFN, 2010). Beta ratio is available from multiple sources such as Yahoo! Finance or Reuters.com 
but when comparing values for two different years it is important to make sure the ratios are 
calculated consistently. The fact that current beta ratios for the companies varies in all above 
mentioned sources suggests that different publications calculate beta based on market returns for 
different time periods. Since when and how long these periods were is not disclosed it is important 
to collect data for two years from a single source. Due to the fact that historic beta values were only 
available at ADVFN, current beta values were also taken from there. Information about board 
composition of the companies is available at Hemscott Company Guru (Hemscott, 2010) for the 
year 2010 and in the companies’ annual reports for the year 2007. 
The research is going to be of quantitative character and study correlation between board 
composition and beta values. SPSS will be used for working with numerical data. 
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Main limitations of the proposed research are the allowed time frame of one academic semester as 
well as limited resources at hand. Undertaking primary research examining the board processes 
with a special attention to risk management decisions could be a great supplement but for the 
following reasons it is not feasible in practice. Firstly, gaining access to actual board’s activities is 
nearly impossible, especially in the times of crisis. Even if it is, the degree of credibility and fullness 
of the information disclosed would be impossible to assess. Secondly, even if the access to one or 
several boards would be gained, gaining access to the boards of all companies from the sample is 
beyond realistic. Thirdly, primary research of so many boards would take far more time than is 
given for the research. 
One of the limitations is the availability of the information. For this reason FTSE 100 Index was 
chosen as a population of the study since such information as beta ratio, both current and historical, 
is rather hard to obtain for other companies. 
Another limitation is the extent to which the results of this study can potentially explain the 
relationship between board composition and risk. It is true that risk management decision is one of 
the core decisions that boards of directors are responsible for, but it does not allow speculation that 
board, and its composition in particular, is the only factor affecting company’s systematic risk. 
Moreover, the exact time when beta values for 2007 were taken and the time of the publication of 
the companies’ annual reports with information about board composition at that time may be 
different, especially given the fact that the companies release annual reports at different times. This 
fact allows some level of uncertainty regarding the consistency of board composition & beta values 
prior to the crises. 
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4. Results 
4.1. Statistical description of the sample 
Table 2.1 (Appendix 2) provides statistics for the studied 79 companies for 2007. The average size 
of the board among the companies was 11.6709 with the smallest board being comprised of 6 
directors and the largest one of 19. Executive directors were a minority in the boards with 
minimum number of executive directors being 1 while the minimum number of non-executive 
directors was 4. On average, non-executive directors dominated the boards with the mean 
proportion of non-executive directors in the boards being 66.6871%. The smallest proportion of 
non-executive directors was 45.50% meaning that one or some of the boards were insider 
dominated. Beta ratios ranged from a low 0.28 to 5.36 averaging at 1.0726. 
Table 2.2 (Appendix 2) provides similar descriptive statistics for the studied 79 companies but for 
the year 2010. The average size of the board among the companies was 11.1772, a slight decrease 
from 2007. The smallest board included 6 directors and the largest one 21. The number of 
executive directors in the boards ranged from 1 to 8 with an average number being 3.4177. The 
number of non-executive directors ranged from 3 to 15 with averaging at 7.7595. On average, non-
executive directors dominated the boards with the mean proportion of non-executive directors in 
the boards being 69.1023%, nearly 3% increase from 2007. The smallest proportion of non-
executive directors was 50.00% meaning that none of the boards were insider dominated. Beta 
ratios ranged from a low 0.12 to 8.87 averaging at 1.1787. 
Table 2.3 (Appendix 2) represents descriptive statistics of the change in beta, board size and 
proportion of non-executive directors in the studied 79 companies between 2007 and 2010. The 
differences in beta ranged from the biggest decrease of -0.74 to dramatic increase of 8.01. On 
average, beta ratio has increased by 0.1062. The changes in board size varied from the biggest 
board size reduction of 5 directors to the biggest increase, also of five directors. On average, the 
board size has increased by 0.4937 directors. The change in proportion of non-executive directors 
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varied from the decrease of 12.78% to an increase of 30.91%. On average, the proportion of non-
executive directors in the boards of the studied companies has increased by 2.4153%. 
4.2. Result of the Bivariate correlation analysis  
In order to analyse the relationship between the companies’ board composition, as measured by 
the proportion of non-executive directors, and beta ratios, bivariate correlation analysis through 
Pearson Coefficient was used. Correlation coefficient illustrates the magnitude and direction of 
relationships (Cooper & Schindler, 2008) and therefore suits for the purposes of the purposes of 
this study. 
Table 3.1 (Appendix 3) represents the result of the bivariate correlation analysis of the change in 
the board composition and the change in beta for all 79 companies in the sample. Significance level 
of the correlation is 0.663. Such significance means that there is no significant relationship between 
the two variables if applied to all companies in the sample. Pearson correlation is negative but very 
insignificant being -0.090. 
Table 3.2 (Appendix 3) represents the result of the bivariate correlation analysis of the change in 
the board composition and the change in beta for the companies in which the proportion of outside 
directors in the board has increased. Significance level of the correlation is 0.812. Such significance 
means that there is no significant relationship between the two variables when applied to 
companies with increased proportion of outside directors in the companies’ boards. Pearson 
correlation is positive but very insignificant being 0.044. 
Table 3.3 (Appendix 3) represents the result of the bivariate correlation analysis of the change in 
the board composition and the change in beta for the companies in which the proportion of outside 
directors in the board has decreased. Significance level of the correlation is 0.159. Such significance 
means that there is a significant relationship between the two variables when applied to companies 
with decreased proportion of outside directors in the companies’ boards. Pearson correlation is 
negative equalling -0.290, indicating the presence of significant relationship between the variables. 
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Table 3.4 (Appendix 3) represents the result of the bivariate correlation analysis of the change in 
the board composition and the change in beta for the companies in which the proportion of outside 
directors has changed, in either direction. Significance level of the correlation is 0.505. Such 
significance means that there is no significant relationship between the two variables. Pearson 
correlation is negative equalling  -0.090, indicating the presence of significant relationship between 
the variables. 
For the companies, in which the proportion of outside directors in the board has not changed, 
bivariate correlation analysis is not applicable. However, since one of the variables (the proportion 
of outside directors in the board) has not changed it was interesting to investigate whether the 
other variable (Beta) has changed or stayed the same. Table 4.1 (Appendix 4) shows the average 
change of Beta ratio for the companies in this cluster. As can be seen from the table, the average 
change of Beta for 22 companies was 45.68%. Such result is caused by the presence of an unusual 
case as the Beta of one company (Thomas Cook) has increased by around 930%. Excluding this 
anomaly, the average change in Beta for the companies is an increase by 3.5%. 
Table 4.1 also shows average change in Beta for the companies in which the proportion of outside 
directors in the companies’ boards has changed in either direction. On average Beta decreased by 
1.06% for the companies in Cluster 1 and an increase by 2,73% for the companies in Cluster 2. 
Comparing these results with the average change of Beta for the companies with an unchanged 
proportion of outside directors in the companies’ boards, it can be concluded that the companies 
with an unchanged proportion of outside directors in the boards have experienced the highest 
average change in beta among all three clusters. 
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5. Discussion 
5.1. General discussion of the results 
The results of the research results lead to a conclusion that the change in board composition and 
change Beta ratio are not correlated in the scope of the overall sample. Therefore, hypothesis (1) 
that the change in board composition, in either direction has an impact on the effectiveness of 
board’s decisions regarding risk management, reflected by the change in the market-based beta, 
cannot not confirmed. Hypothesis (2) which predicted that, in accordance with agency theory, an 
increase in the proportion of non-executive directors in the companies’ boards would result in the 
decrease in the company’s Beta is also rejected by the results of this study. Hypothesis (3), 
however, which predicted that, also in accordance with agency theory, a decrease in the proportion 
of non-executive directors in the companies’ boards would result in an increase in the companies’ 
beta, is confirmed since a negative relationship of small significance between the two variables has 
been identified. The results also show that the relationship between the change in board 
composition in either direction and the change in Beta does not exist. 
The results in general show weak support to the agency theory perspective that higher 
representation of non-executive directors on a company’s board leads to better board decisions. 
Rather, they might serve as indicators of investors’ negative reaction on the decrease in the 
proportion of outsiders in the companies’ boards. The impact of an increased proportion of outside 
directors on investors’ perception of the companies’ risk has not been identified. Contradictory 
results of this study can also be attributed to the limitations of the research, particularly in regards 
to the small size of the studied sample which can result in either very weak or very strong 
relationships (Cooper & Schindler, 2008). 
Dahya and McConnell (2005) noted that the recommendation of greater representation of outside 
directors in corporate boards, which was included in many corporate governance guidelines 
published since 1993, underlies a presumption that ‘boards with significant outside directors will 
make different and, perhaps, better decisions than boards dominated by insiders’. The results of 
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this study, however, suggest little support to the existence of the relationship between outsider-
proportion of the boards and effectiveness of their decisions regarding risk. Only among companies 
with reduced outsider composition between 2007 and 2010 the small negative relationship with 
beta was identified. 
Although failing to identify a significant relationship between board composition and its 
effectiveness in taking decisions regarding risk, the results of this study do not lead to a conclusion 
that board composition and board decisions are not correlated. The fact that one performance 
measure study is successful does not mean that it makes board efficient in everything 
(Sundaramurthy, 2000). Logically, the opposite is true as well – if one performance measure study 
is unsuccessful it does not mean that the board is inefficient in performing all of its tasks or that all 
of its decisions have negative effect on all performance indicators. In other words, the absence of a 
strong relationship between the change in board composition and change in beta should not lead to 
a conclusion that there is no relationship between board composition and various board 
performance proxies. 
Previous studies have identified significant relationships between various demographic 
characteristics of boards and their decisions. Other studies have found the link between outsider 
representation and the level of fraud (Uzun, Szewczyk & Varma, 2004), with higher proportion of 
non-executive directors leading to lower risk of fraud, and the higher CEO turnover (Weisbach, 
1988). The addition of a non-executive director to the board was found to have a positive impact on 
firm value (Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990). Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994) identified a positive 
relationship between the announcement of poison pills and average stock market reaction for the 
companies with outsider-dominated boards and negative for the companies with board dominated 
by inside directors. Dahya and McConnell (2005) found that in the UK the board which complied 
with the proposed standards of increasing the number of non-executive directors in their boards, 
were more likely to appoint outside chief executive officers. 
One of the reasons that affect the decrease in fraud rates among companies with higher outsider 
representation on their boards is that non-executive directors are motivated to responsibly 
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perform their control duties due to the fear of reputation loss and the risk of lawsuits (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). Beasley (1996) also found a negative relationship between the higher outsider-
proportion on the corporate frauds and likelihood of financial statement fraud which he argued was 
a result of the boards’ better execution of its control and monitoring responsibilities.  
Some scholars argued that for various firms, depending on the context, boards with different 
composition, outsider- or insider-dominated, may be more appropriate. Firms operating in highly 
uncertain environments, for example, may benefit from a board which has comprehensive inside 
information available through an insider-dominated board (Rhoades, Rechner & Sundaramurthy, 
2000). Besides, Rediker and Seth (1995) found that in some cases, when a company is owned by 
one or several large stockholders, various monitoring mechanisms may well be substituted and 
owners may find higher proportion of outsiders unnecessary for monitoring purposes. This can be 
confirmed by the findings of Agrawal & Mandelker (1990) that indicated significant role played by 
institutional investors in monitoring corporate activity and reinforced by Shleifer & Vishny (1986) 
who argued that large investors are highly motivated to monitor managerial activity. 
Another study has found that companies that have greater institutional ownership and stronger 
outside control of the board enjoy lower bond yields and higher ratings on their new bond issues. 
However, concentrated institutional ownership has an adverse effect on yields and ratings. These 
results are robust to a specification that controls for institutional ownership being influenced by 
bond yields. (Bonds and Yields). 
The research of Coles, Daniel & Naveen (2005) also provides support that some firms may benefit 
from having boards with larger proportion of insiders. The scholars argue that ‘certain kinds of 
firms might benefit from higher insider representation on the board. Inside directors possess more 
firm-specific knowledge. Thus we conjecture that firms, for which the firm-specific knowledge of 
insiders is relatively important, such as R&D-intensive firms, may derive greater value from having 
higher fraction of insiders on the board’. Thus, it was found that boards of bigger size and higher 
insider-proportion on the corporate boards are likely to increase a company’s spending on R&D 
which was proved to have a significant impact on firm performance (Capon et al, 1990). 
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Board effectiveness in performing its monitoring function, however, is not influenced only by the 
number of outsiders in the corporate board. Several studies identified the relationship between 
board size and board’s effectiveness in performing its monitoring role. Coles, Daniel & Naveen 
(2005), for example concluded that smaller boards are more effective at monitoring due to higher 
degree of cohesiveness, higher productivity while the effectiveness of large groups in performing 
their monitoring function is often hindered by such problems as social loafing and higher co-
ordination costs. 
Outside directors serve both to monitor top management and to advise the CEO on business 
strategy (Coles, Daniel & Naveen, 2005).  
Boone et al. (2005) also found that, in accordance with the view that specific nature of the firm’s 
competitive environment and managerial team – drive corporate board size and composition. 
On the other hand, the companies that operate in an environment characterised by high level of 
organisational slack may find themselves in need of increased monitoring which outsider-
dominated board presumably provide. Moreover, ‘under these circumstances, outsider-dominated 
boards may more effectively mitigate the agency conflicts associated with the potential 
misallocation of excess resources’ (Rhoades, Rechner & Sundaramurthy, 2000). 
The boards with the equally balanced inside and outside representation may fail to achieve the 
benefits of either outsider- or insider-dominated board structures. This balanced approach hinders 
the governance process by limiting the availability and access to rich inside information or by 
limiting the will of the board to monitor and discipline managerial action. Morevoer, it is possible 
that the conflict between two equal, and potentially opposing, forces results in a lack of coherent 
vision and/or action (Rhoades, Rechner & Sundaramurthy, 2000). 
Carpenter & Westphal argued that in order to assess directors’ ability to contribute to the strategic 
decision making process it is important to consider external determinants of directors’ knowledge 
and perspective. The scholars found that ‘the simple number of director appointments to other 
boards does not influence board involvement, appointments that have the potential to provide 
37 
 
directors with relevant strategic knowledge and perspective do enhance the board's ability to 
contribute to the strategic decision making process’. Their findings also show the potential power 
of models that link the broader, social-structural context in which boards are embedded, as well as 
the environmental conditions that surround them, with micro-behavioral processes that occur 
inside the "black box" of corporate boards. 
Rhoades, Rechner and Sundaramurthy (2000) establish three other issues that must be addressed 
when examining the managerial effects of board composition. They are ‘monitoring as a behavior, 
the quality of boards and their directors, and other mechanisms for achieving owner-interested 
actions’ (Rhoades, Rechner & Sundaramurthy, 2000). According to Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1994), 
insider/outsider ratios are no more than just proxies for the behavioral phenomena of monitoring. 
In the study they argue that the presence of insiders or outsiders on a board itself does not result 
into monitoring of managerial activity and even if it does, the monitoring is not necessarily done in 
the interest of shareholders. Rhoades, Rechner and Sundaramurthy (2000) addressed this issue 
and related it to board quality arguing that all outside directors are different based on their 
‘industry/occupation background, executive/managerial experience, time availability, and other 
potential skills or experience’ (Rhoades, Rechner & Sundaramurthy, 2000). Based on these 
differences some non-executive directors are arguably more suited for better fulfilling of their 
roles. 
An increased proportion of inside directors on a company’s board may result in an increase in beta, 
which makes a company riskier in investors’ eyes but it does not mean that it cannot have a positive 
impact on other decisions that a board is responsible for. 
Although scholars are aware of the fact that small sample size studies can lead to certain errors in 
the conclusions (this is not always eliminated even by employing significance testing), the realities 
of sampling leaves no other choice but to rely on less than perfect samples. 
One of the major problems in the study of the effect that outside directors have on the boards’ 
decisions is the difficulty of identifying the true level of independence of non-executive directors. 
With the reference to Kosnick (1987), Uzun, Szewczyk & Varma (2004) note that some of the 
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outside directors may be related to the companies’ management through business or even family 
ties, which makes such directors less likely to perform their monitoring duties. As a result of such 
variance in outside directors’ independence, they were classified as independent or gray. It is 
argued that higher representation of ‘independent’ outside directors in the corporate board is 
positively related to board effectiveness in its monitoring function (Uzun, Szewczyk & Varma, 
2004) In the scope of this research, it was impossible to identify the level of true independence of 
non-executive directors, which results in significant limitation, which might have hindered the true 
level of impact independent boards have on beta. 
5.2. Limitations 
The outcomes of the research, however, are likely to have been affected by several limitations. 
Firstly, the size of the studied sample (79 companies) is rather small, which may potentially 
increase probability of the relationships being particularly good or particularly bad. Therefore it is 
harder to find significant relationships from the data, as statistical tests normally require a larger 
sample size to justify that the effect did not just happened by chance alone. The reason such small 
sample was studied was the availability of the data regarding beta ratio. Among LSE listed 
companies, historical beta ratios were only available for the FTSE 100 index. Although, the number 
of the companies in the list is 100, in order to compare the effect the change in board composition 
has on market based beta, only those companies that were present at the Index during both 2007 
and 2010 were included in the study. In total, 79 companies made the index at both years. 
Secondly, the results of the study are based only on the quantitative research, while the 
combination of quantitative and qualitative research would be arguably more beneficial. 
Quantitative research does not recognize specific features of different boards such as actual 
independence of non-executive directors, board processes and group dynamics within the boards 
which all are argued to have an influence on board’s decisions. 
Thirdly, the research does not recognise board features other than the proportion of outside 
directors and therefore assumes that boards with equal proportion of outside directors supposedly 
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take similar decisions. This may not be the case since board decisions depend on other 
characteristics of board composition such as CEO or chairman independence. In addition the 
research does not examine the nature of outside directors’ directorship and involvement in other 
firms which importance is argued by Mizruchi, 1996 who argued that boards have the greatest 
power to fulfill these responsibilities when their members hold multiple directorships. 
Fourthly, the fact that the sample includes companies selected based solely on the level of market 
capitalisation (FTSE 100 index of LSE) may have hindered the identification of the relationship 
between board composition and beta. The reason for this is the fact that the companies represent 
different industrial sectors, such as banking, mining, automobiles, etc., all of which are 
characterised by different environmental factors influencing the firm. It has been argued that firms 
operating in different environments may benefit from different board composition. 
Fifthly, while the data for board composition and beta values for 2010 were taken at the same time 
and from one source, the data for 2007 had to be taken from different sources: beta ratio was taken 
from ADVFN (http://www.advfn.com) while the data regarding board composition was derived 
from the companies’ annual reports for 2007. Even though the data were taken within the same 
year, there is a strong possibility that that board composition was different from the one stated at 
an annual report at the time when beta were actually taken. The reasons for this are the absence of 
the exact date for which the published beta was true and the fact that different companies publish 
annual reports at different times during the year. 
Another limitation is the possible presence of unusual cases that might have distorted the tested 
relationships between the variables. Such cases may have particularly strong impact on the study of 
a relatively small sample. 
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6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the results of the current research do not fully confirm or disconfirm the general 
hypothesis that the change in board composition affects board decision in regards of risk 
management, as measure by market-based beta. The fact that a relationship of small significance 
between the change in board composition and the change in beta was only identified in the case of 
companies, in which the proportion of outside directors the boards had decreased, cannot serve as 
a strong evidence of the existence of the relationship between the two variables, especially given 
the small size of the general sample and even smaller number of companies with the decreased 
proportion of outside-directors on their boards. However, the relationship cannot be disapproved 
either. 
In order to further explore the relationship between the change in board composition and board 
decision, future research could study the relationship on a bigger sample of companies. Besides, 
given the limitations of quantitative research performed in isolation (Cooper & Schindler, 2008), 
which ignores group dynamics that can influence board’s effectiveness (Forbes & Milliken, 1999), 
future research on boards should incorporate qualitative methods in order to better understand 
the relationship between various board characteristics, board decisions and as a result firm 
performance. 
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Appendices 
1. Appendix 1 Sample 
1.1. Table 1.1: List of companies in the sample 
The list of the companies included in the sample comprises 79 companies which were included in 
FTSE 100 Index of London Stock Exchange in both 2007 and 2010. The list of the companies is 
presented in an alphabetical order in the table below. 
N Name of the company N Name of the company N Name of the company 
1 3I GROUP 28 GLAXOSMITHKLINE 55 RIO TINTO 
2 ADMIRAL GROUP 29 HAMMERSON 56 ROLLS-ROYCE 
3 AMEC 30 HOME RETAIL 57 ROYAL BANK SCOT 
4 ANGLO AMERICAN 31 HSBC HLDGS.UK 58 SABMILLER 
5 ANTOFAGASTA 32 ICAP 59 SAGE GRP. 
6 ASTRAZENECA 33 IMP.TOBACCO GRP 60 SAINSBURY(J) 
7 AVIVA 34 INTERCON. HOTEL 61 SCHRODERS 
8 BAE SYSTEMS 35 INTL POWER 62 SCOT.&STH.ENRGY 
9 BARCLAYS 36 KAZAKHMYS 63 SEVERN TRENT 
10 BG GROUP 37 KINGFISHER 64 SHIRE 
11 BHP BILLITON 38 LAND SECS. 65 SMITH&NEPHEW 
12 BP 39 LEGAL&GEN. 66 SMITHS GROUP 
13 BRITISH AIRWAYS 40 LIBERTY INTL. 67 STAND.CHART. 
14 BRITISH AMER.TOB. 41 LLOYDS GRP. 68 STD LIFE 
15 BR.LAND 42 LON.STK.EXCH 69 TESCO 
16 BSKYB 43 LONMIN 70 THOMAS COOK 
17 BT GROUP 44 MAN GROUP 71 TUI TRAVEL 
18 CABLE&WW 45 MARKS & SP. 72 TULLOW OIL 
19 CAIRN ENERGY 46 NATIONAL GRID 73 UNILEVER 
20 CAPITA 47 NEXT 74 UTD. UTILITIES 
21 GROUP 48 OLD MUTUAL 75 VEDANTA 
22 CARNIVAL 49 PEARSON 76 VODAFONE GRP. 
23 CENTRICA 50 PRUDENTIAL 77 WHITBREAD 
24 COMPASS GROUP 51 RDS 'A' 78 WOLSELEY 
25 DIAGEO 52 RECKITT BEN. GP 79 XSTRATA 
26 EXPERIAN 53 REED ELSEVIER   
27 G4S 54 REXAM   
      
1.2. Table 1.2: Beta and Board Composition of the companies in 2007 
The table below lists the companies in the sample and provides the companies’ beta ratio and board 
composition for 2007. Board composition in this case implies the proportion of non-executive 
directors in the companies’ boards and was calculated by dividing the number of non-executive 
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directors by the total number of directors in the board and multiplied by 100 to achieve the 
percentage figure. 
N Company Beta Executive Dir. Non-executive Dir Board Composition 
1 3I GROUP 1,03 3 7 70,00% 
2 ADMIRAL GROUP 0,85 3 7 70,00% 
3 AMEC 1,09 3 6 66,67% 
4 ANGLO AMERICAN 1,77 4 12 75,00% 
5 ANTOFAGASTA 1,41 1 8 88,89% 
6 ASTRAZENECA 0,35 2 9 81,82% 
7 AVIVA 1,53 5 9 64,29% 
8 BAE SYSTEMS 0,70 4 7 63,64% 
9 BARCLAYS 2,18 6 11 64,71% 
10 BG GROUP 0,49 2 9 81,82% 
11 BHP BILLITON 1,29 4 6 60,00% 
12 BP 0,70 7 11 61,11% 
13 BRITISH AIRWAYS 1,56 2 9 81,82% 
14 BRITISH 
AMER.TOB. 
0,59 3 9 75,00% 
15 BR.LAND 1,00 5 8 61,54% 
16 BSKYB 0,95 2 12 85,71% 
17 BT GROUP 1,10 6 9 60,00% 
18 CABLE&WW 0,50 4 6 60,00% 
19 CAIRN ENERGY 1,17 6 6 50,00% 
20 CAPITA 0,28 4 4 50,00% 
21 GROUP 1,08 3 11 78,57% 
22 CARNIVAL 0,58 5 5 50,00% 
23 CENTRICA 0,84 3 7 70,00% 
24 COMPASS GROUP 0,61 2 9 81,82% 
25 DIAGEO 0,62 3 7 70,00% 
26 EXPERIAN 0,63 3 7 70,00% 
27 G4S 0,45 3 11 78,57% 
28 GLAXOSMITHKLINE 1,02 5 6 54,55% 
29 HAMMERSON 0,90 2 4 66,67% 
30 HOME RETAIL 1,14 3 16 84,21% 
31 HSBC HLDGS.UK 0,87 4 5 55,56% 
32 ICAP 0,49 5 8 61,54% 
33 IMP.TOBACCO GRP 1,55 4 9 69,23% 
34 INTERCON. HOTEL 1,24 5 5 50,00% 
35 INTL POWER 2,49 2 7 77,78% 
36 KAZAKHMYS 0,85 3 7 70,00% 
37 KINGFISHER 1,20 5 6 54,55% 
38 LAND SECS. 1,66 4 7 63,64% 
39 LEGAL&GEN. 0,87 5 10 66,67% 
40 LIBERTY INTL. 1,72 6 9 60,00% 
41 LLOYDS GRP. 0,91 2 7 77,78% 
42 LON.STK.EXCH 1,93 2 8 80,00% 
43 LONMIN 0,92 3 5 62,50% 
44 MAN GROUP 0,75 3 6 66,67% 
45 MARKS & SP. 0,53 6 5 45,45% 
46 NATIONAL GRID 0,59 5 8 61,54% 
47 NEXT 0,85 4 5 55,56% 
48 OLD MUTUAL 1,85 3 8 72,73% 
49 PEARSON 0,64 5 7 58,33% 
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1.3. Table 1.3: Beta and Board Composition of the companies in 2010 
The information provided in the table below is similar to the information provided in Table 1.2. The 
only difference is the year for which information is given. 
50 PRUDENTIAL 1,51 7 9 56,25% 
51 RDS 'A' 0,89 5 9 64,29% 
52 RECKITT BEN. GP 0,42 2 9 81,82% 
53 REED ELSEVIER 0,56 5 8 61,54% 
54 REXAM 0,55 4 6 60,00% 
55 RIO TINTO 1,41 3 12 80,00% 
56 ROLLS-ROYCE 1,22 6 8 57,14% 
57 ROYAL BANK SCOT 2,49 5 12 70,59% 
58 SABMILLER 1,12 2 13 86,67% 
59 SAGE GRP. 0,77 5 6 54,55% 
60 SAINSBURY(J) 0,62 2 6 75,00% 
61 SCHRODERS 1,26 4 8 66,67% 
62 SCOT.&STH.ENRGY 0,43 4 6 60,00% 
63 SEVERN TRENT 0,43 3 5 62,50% 
64 SHIRE 0,90 2 8 80,00% 
65 SMITH&NEPHEW 0,53 2 6 75,00% 
66 SMITHS GROUP 1,06 3 6 66,67% 
67 STAND.CHART. 1,57 5 11 68,75% 
68 STD LIFE 0,63 4 7 63,64% 
69 TESCO 0,81 7 8 53,33% 
70 THOMAS COOK 0,86 4 8 66,67% 
71 TUI TRAVEL 0,74 6 6 50,00% 
72 TULLOW OIL 0,94 7 6 46,15% 
73 UNILEVER 0,60 3 11 78,57% 
74 UTD. UTILITIES 0,45 4 8 66,67% 
75 VEDANTA 2,31 3 4 57,14% 
76 VODAFONE GRP. 0,86 4 11 73,33% 
77 WHITBREAD 1,17 3 6 66,67% 
78 WOLSELEY 5,36 4 6 60,00% 
79 XSTRATA 1,94 3 8 72,73% 
      
N Company Beta Executive Dir. Non-executive Dir Board Composition 
1 3I GROUP 1,09 2 7 77,78% 
2 ADMIRAL GROUP 0,95 3 7 70,00% 
3 AMEC 1,03 3 5 62,50% 
4 ANGLO AMERICAN 1,79 2 9 81,82% 
5 ANTOFAGASTA 1,39 1 7 87,50% 
6 ASTRAZENECA 0,4 2 10 83,33% 
7 AVIVA 1,44 4 9 69,23% 
8 BAE SYSTEMS 0,83 3 10 76,92% 
9 BARCLAYS 2,03 3 10 76,92% 
10 BG GROUP 0,59 3 9 75,00% 
11 BHP BILLITON 1,31 1 10 90,91% 
12 BP 0,76 5 9 64,29% 
13 BRITISH AIRWAYS 1,49 2 8 80,00% 
14 BRITISH 
AMER.TOB. 0,57 3 8 72,73% 
15 BR.LAND 1,1 5 8 61,54% 
49 
 
16 BSKYB 0,85 2 12 85,71% 
17 BT GROUP 1,08 4 6 60,00% 
18 CABLE&WW 0,62 2 3 60,00% 
19 CAIRN ENERGY 1,18 6 6 50,00% 
20 CAPITA 0,28 4 4 50,00% 
21 GROUP 1,1 3 11 78,57% 
22 CARNIVAL 0,63 5 5 50,00% 
23 CENTRICA 0,8 3 7 70,00% 
24 COMPASS GROUP 0,58 2 9 81,82% 
25 DIAGEO 0,6 3 6 66,67% 
26 EXPERIAN 0,73 3 6 66,67% 
27 G4S 0,44 3 10 76,92% 
28 GLAXOSMITHKLINE 1,09 3 6 66,67% 
29 HAMMERSON 0,9 2 4 66,67% 
30 HOME RETAIL 1,09 6 15 71,43% 
31 HSBC HLDGS.UK 0,99 4 4 50,00% 
32 ICAP 0,5 4 9 69,23% 
33 IMP.TOBACCO GRP 1,55 2 7 77,78% 
34 INTERCON. HOTEL 1,28 6 6 50,00% 
35 INTL POWER 2,41 3 7 70,00% 
36 KAZAKHMYS 0,81 2 7 77,78% 
37 KINGFISHER 1,25 4 7 63,64% 
38 LAND SECS. 1,62 4 8 66,67% 
39 LEGAL&GEN. 0,98 4 8 66,67% 
40 LIBERTY INTL. 1,71 5 9 64,29% 
41 LLOYDS GRP. 1,04 2 9 81,82% 
42 LON.STK.EXCH 1,95 2 7 77,78% 
43 LONMIN 1,13 2 7 77,78% 
44 MAN GROUP 0,82 5 6 54,55% 
45 MARKS & SP. 0,48 4 7 63,64% 
46 NATIONAL GRID 0,55 5 8 61,54% 
47 NEXT 0,84 4 5 55,56% 
48 OLD MUTUAL 1,82 2 9 81,82% 
49 PEARSON 0,68 5 6 54,55% 
50 PRUDENTIAL 1,52 6 8 57,14% 
51 RDS 'A' 0,9 3 10 76,92% 
52 RECKITT BEN. GP 0,42 2 8 80,00% 
53 REED ELSEVIER 0,58 3 7 70,00% 
54 REXAM 0,68 2 6 75,00% 
55 RIO TINTO 1,43 3 13 81,25% 
56 ROLLS-ROYCE 1,31 5 9 64,29% 
57 ROYAL BANK SCOT 2,4 2 10 83,33% 
58 SABMILLER 1,16 3 13 81,25% 
59 SAGE GRP. 0,84 5 6 54,55% 
60 SAINSBURY(J) 0,65 3 7 70,00% 
61 SCHRODERS 1,38 5 8 61,54% 
62 SCOT.&STH.ENRGY 0,48 4 6 60,00% 
63 SEVERN TRENT 0,48 5 6 54,55% 
64 SHIRE 0,96 2 7 77,78% 
65 SMITH&NEPHEW 0,53 2 9 81,82% 
66 SMITHS GROUP 1,11 3 5 62,50% 
67 STAND.CHART. 1,53 6 10 62,50% 
68 STD LIFE 0,67 2 8 80,00% 
69 TESCO 0,77 8 9 52,94% 
70 THOMAS COOK 8,87 3 6 66,67% 
50 
 
 
1.4. Table 1.4: Changes in Beta and Board Composition 
Information about the changes between Beta and Board Composition for 79 companies in the 
sample is presented in the table below. 
71 TUI TRAVEL 0,74 5 12 70,59% 
72 TULLOW OIL 1 5 6 54,55% 
73 UNILEVER 0,12 2 12 85,71% 
74 UTD. UTILITIES 0,48 3 6 66,67% 
75 VEDANTA 2,39 3 3 50,00% 
76 VODAFONE GRP. 0,79 4 10 71,43% 
77 WHITBREAD 1,22 3 6 66,67% 
78 WOLSELEY 4,62 3 7 70,00% 
79 XSTRATA 1,94 3 8 72,73% 
      
N Company Change in 
Beta (%) 
Change in Board Composition (%) 
1 3I GROUP 5,64% 7,78% 
2 ADMIRAL GROUP 12,36% 0,00% 
3 AMEC -5,33% -4,17% 
4 ANGLO AMERICAN 0,90% 6,82% 
5 ANTOFAGASTA -1,62% -1,39% 
6 ASTRAZENECA 15,24% 1,52% 
7 AVIVA -6,01% 4,95% 
8 BAE SYSTEMS 19,22% 13,29% 
9 BARCLAYS -7,07% 12,22% 
10 BG GROUP 20,24% -6,82% 
11 BHP BILLITON 1,23% 30,91% 
12 BP 8,28% 3,17% 
13 BRITISH AIRWAYS -4,69% -1,82% 
14 BRITISH AMER.TOB. -4,04% -2,27% 
15 BR.LAND 9,46% 0,00% 
16 BSKYB -10,78% 0,00% 
17 BT GROUP -1,98% 0,00% 
18 CABLE&WW 23,85% 0,00% 
19 CAIRN ENERGY 0,50% 0,00% 
20 CAPITA 0,36% 0,00% 
21 GROUP 2,14% 0,00% 
22 CARNIVAL 9,32% 0,00% 
23 CENTRICA -4,88% 0,00% 
24 COMPASS GROUP -4,67% 0,00% 
25 DIAGEO -3,98% -3,33% 
26 EXPERIAN 15,60% -3,33% 
27 G4S -1,17% -1,65% 
28 GLAXOSMITHKLINE 6,80% 12,12% 
29 HAMMERSON 0,54% 0,00% 
30 HOME RETAIL -4,22% -12,78% 
31 HSBC HLDGS.UK 14,19% -5,56% 
32 ICAP 1,07% 7,69% 
33 IMP.TOBACCO GRP 0,32% 8,55% 
34 INTERCON. HOTEL 3,58% 0,00% 
35 INTL POWER -3,26% -7,78% 
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1.5. Table 1.5: Cluster 1 - Companies with an increased proportion of outside directors 
on the board; beta and board composition change 
The table below lists 32 companies, in which the proportion of outside directors in the boards of 
directors has increased, and provides the figures representing the degree of the change in the 
36 KAZAKHMYS -4,41% 7,78% 
37 KINGFISHER 4,54% 9,09% 
38 LAND SECS. -2,54% 3,03% 
39 LEGAL&GEN. 12,14% 0,00% 
40 LIBERTY INTL. -0,75% 4,29% 
41 LLOYDS GRP. 13,89% 4,04% 
42 LON.STK.EXCH 1,18% -2,22% 
43 LONMIN 22,87% 15,28% 
44 MAN GROUP 8,65% -12,12% 
45 MARKS & SP. -8,62% 18,18% 
46 NATIONAL GRID -6,10% 0,00% 
47 NEXT -1,51% 0,00% 
48 OLD MUTUAL -1,86% 9,09% 
49 PEARSON 6,94% -3,79% 
50 PRUDENTIAL 0,87% 0,89% 
51 RDS 'A' 1,20% 12,64% 
52 RECKITT BEN. GP -0,19% -1,82% 
53 REED ELSEVIER 4,28% 8,46% 
54 REXAM 22,59% 15,00% 
55 RIO TINTO 1,78% 1,25% 
56 ROLLS-ROYCE 7,44% 7,14% 
57 ROYAL BANK SCOT -3,73% 12,75% 
58 SABMILLER 3,94% -5,42% 
59 SAGE GRP. 8,46% 0,00% 
60 SAINSBURY(J) 4,50% -5,00% 
61 SCHRODERS 9,26% -5,13% 
62 SCOT.&STH.ENRGY 11,19% 0,00% 
63 SEVERN TRENT 12,46% -7,95% 
64 SHIRE 6,15% -2,22% 
65 SMITH&NEPHEW 0,44% 6,82% 
66 SMITHS GROUP 4,98% -4,17% 
67 STAND.CHART. -2,61% -6,25% 
68 STD LIFE 5,56% 16,36% 
69 TESCO -4,62% -0,39% 
70 THOMAS COOK 930,08% 0,00% 
71 TUI TRAVEL 0,26% 20,59% 
72 TULLOW OIL 6,30% 8,39% 
73 UNILEVER -79,96% 7,14% 
74 UTD. UTILITIES 6,64% 0,00% 
75 VEDANTA 3,61% -7,14% 
76 VODAFONE GRP. -7,74% -1,90% 
77 WHITBREAD 4,44% 0,00% 
78 WOLSELEY -13,76% 10,00% 
79 XSTRATA -0,16% 0,00% 
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proportion of outside directors in the companies’ boards as well as the percentage of change of Beta 
in these companies. 
 
1.6. Table 1.6: Cluster 2 - Companies with a decreased proportion of outside directors on 
the board; beta and board composition change 
The table below lists 25 companies, in which the proportion of outside directors in the boards of 
directors decreased, and provides the figures representing the degree of the change in the 
proportion of outside directors in the companies’ boards as well as the percentage of change of Beta 
in these companies. 
N Company Change in 
Beta (%) 
Change in Board Composition (%) 
1 3I GRP. 5,64% 7,78% 
2 ANGLO AMERICAN 0,90% 6,82% 
3 ASTRAZENECA 15,24% 1,52% 
4 AVIVA -6,01% 4,95% 
5 BAE SYS. 19,22% 13,29% 
6 BARCLAYS -7,07% 12,22% 
7 BHP BILLITON 1,23% 30,91% 
8 BP 8,28% 3,17% 
9 HAMMERSON 6,80% 12,12% 
10 IMP.TOBACCO GRP 1,07% 7,69% 
11 INTERCON. HOTEL 0,32% 8,55% 
12 KINGFISHER -4,41% 7,78% 
13 LAND SECS. 4,54% 9,09% 
14 LEGAL&GEN. -2,54% 3,03% 
15 LLOYDS GRP. -0,75% 4,29% 
16 LON.STK.EXCH 13,89% 4,04% 
17 MAN GROUP 22,87% 15,28% 
18 MORRISON (WM) -8,62% 18,18% 
19 OLD MUTUAL -1,86% 9,09% 
20 PRUDENTIAL 0,87% 0,89% 
21 RDS 'A' 1,20% 12,64% 
22 REED ELSEVIER 4,28% 8,46% 
23 REXAM 22,59% 15,00% 
24 RIO TINTO 1,78% 1,25% 
25 ROLLS-ROYCE 7,44% 7,14% 
26 ROYAL BANK SCOT -3,73% 12,75% 
27 SMITH&NEPHEW 0,44% 6,82% 
28 STD LIFE 5,56% 16,36% 
29 TUI TRAVEL 0,26% 20,59% 
30 TULLOW OIL 6,30% 8,39% 
31 UNILEVER -79,96% 7,14% 
32 WOLSELEY -13,76% 10,00% 
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1.7. Table 1.7: Cluster 3 - Companies with an unchanged proportion of outside directors 
on the board; beta and board composition change 
The table below lists 22 companies, in which the proportion of outside directors in the boards of 
directors stayed the same, and provides the figures representing the degree of the change in the 
proportion of outside directors in the companies’ boards (0% for all companies) and the percentage 
of change of Beta in these companies. 
N Company Change in 
Beta (%) 
Change in Board Composition (%) 
1 AMEC -5,33% -4,17% 
2 ANTOFAGASTA -1,62% -1,39% 
3 BG GRP. 20,24% -6,82% 
4 BR.AIRWAYS -4,69% -1,82% 
5 BR.AMER.TOB. -4,04% -2,27% 
6 EXPERIAN -3,98% -3,33% 
7 G4S 15,60% -3,33% 
8 GLAXOSMITHKLINE -1,17% -1,65% 
9 HSBC HLDGS.UK -4,22% -12,78% 
10 ICAP 14,19% -5,56% 
11 KAZAKHMYS -3,26% -7,78% 
12 LONMIN 1,18% -2,22% 
13 MARKS & SP. 8,65% -12,12% 
14 PEARSON 6,94% -3,79% 
15 RECKITT BEN. GP -0,19% -1,82% 
16 SABMILLER 3,94% -5,42% 
17 SAINSBURY(J) 4,50% -5,00% 
18 SCHRODERS 9,26% -5,13% 
19 SEVERN TRENT 12,46% -7,95% 
20 SHIRE 6,15% -2,22% 
21 SMITHS GROUP 4,98% -4,17% 
22 STAND.CHART. -2,61% -6,25% 
23 TESCO -4,62% -0,39% 
24 VEDANTA 3,61% -7,14% 
25 VODAFONE GRP. -7,74% -1,90% 
N Company Change in 
Beta (%) 
Change in Board Composition (%) 
1 ADMIRAL GRP 12,36% 0,00% 
2 BR.LAND 9,46% 0,00% 
3 BSKYB -10,78% 0,00% 
4 BT GROUP -1,98% 0,00% 
5 CABLE&WW 23,85% 0,00% 
6 CAIRN ENERGY 0,50% 0,00% 
7 CAPITA GROUP 0,36% 0,00% 
8 CARNIVAL 2,14% 0,00% 
9 CENTRICA 9,32% 0,00% 
10 COMPASS GROUP -4,88% 0,00% 
11 DIAGEO -4,67% 0,00% 
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1.8. Table 1.8: Companies from Cluster 1 and Cluster 2; beta and board composition 
change 
The table below lists 57 companies, in which the proportion of outside directors in the boards of 
directors changed in general, and provides the figures representing the degree of the change in the 
proportion of outside directors in the companies’ boards as well as the percentage of change of Beta 
in these companies. 
12 HOME RETAIL 0,54% 0,00% 
13 INTL POWER 3,58% 0,00% 
14 LIBERTY INTL. 12,14% 0,00% 
15 NATIONAL GRID -6,10% 0,00% 
16 NEXT -1,51% 0,00% 
17 SAGE GRP. 8,46% 0,00% 
18 SCOT.&STH.ENRGY 11,19% 0,00% 
19 THOMAS COOK 930,08% 0,00% 
20 UTD. UTILITIES 6,64% 0,00% 
21 WHITBREAD 4,44% 0,00% 
22 XSTRATA -0,16% 0,00% 
N Company Change in 
Beta (%) 
Change in Board Composition (%) 
1 3I GRP. 5,64% 7,78% 
2 ANGLO AMERICAN 0,90% 6,82% 
3 ASTRAZENECA 15,24% 1,52% 
4 AVIVA -6,01% 4,95% 
5 BAE SYS. 19,22% 13,29% 
6 BARCLAYS -7,07% 12,22% 
7 BHP BILLITON 1,23% 30,91% 
8 BP 8,28% 3,17% 
9 HAMMERSON 6,80% 12,12% 
10 IMP.TOBACCO GRP 1,07% 7,69% 
11 INTERCON. HOTEL 0,32% 8,55% 
12 KINGFISHER -4,41% 7,78% 
13 LAND SECS. 4,54% 9,09% 
14 LEGAL&GEN. -2,54% 3,03% 
15 LLOYDS GRP. -0,75% 4,29% 
16 LON.STK.EXCH 13,89% 4,04% 
17 MAN GROUP 22,87% 15,28% 
18 MORRISON (WM) -8,62% 18,18% 
19 OLD MUTUAL -1,86% 9,09% 
20 PRUDENTIAL 0,87% 0,89% 
21 RDS 'A' 1,20% 12,64% 
22 REED ELSEVIER 4,28% 8,46% 
23 REXAM 22,59% 15,00% 
24 RIO TINTO 1,78% 1,25% 
25 ROLLS-ROYCE 7,44% 7,14% 
26 ROYAL BANK SCOT -3,73% 12,75% 
27 SMITH&NEPHEW 0,44% 6,82% 
28 STD LIFE 5,56% 16,36% 
29 TUI TRAVEL 0,26% 20,59% 
30 TULLOW OIL 6,30% 8,39% 
31 UNILEVER -79,96% 7,14% 
32 WOLSELEY -13,76% 10,00% 
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33 AMEC -5,33% -4,17% 
34 ANTOFAGASTA -1,62% -1,39% 
35 BG GRP. 20,24% -6,82% 
36 BR.AIRWAYS -4,69% -1,82% 
37 BR.AMER.TOB. -4,04% -2,27% 
38 EXPERIAN -3,98% -3,33% 
39 G4S 15,60% -3,33% 
40 GLAXOSMITHKLINE -1,17% -1,65% 
41 HSBC HLDGS.UK -4,22% -12,78% 
42 ICAP 14,19% -5,56% 
43 KAZAKHMYS -3,26% -7,78% 
44 LONMIN 1,18% -2,22% 
45 MARKS & SP. 8,65% -12,12% 
46 PEARSON 6,94% -3,79% 
47 RECKITT BEN. GP -0,19% -1,82% 
48 SABMILLER 3,94% -5,42% 
49 SAINSBURY(J) 4,50% -5,00% 
50 SCHRODERS 9,26% -5,13% 
51 SEVERN TRENT 12,46% -7,95% 
52 SHIRE 6,15% -2,22% 
53 SMITHS GROUP 4,98% -4,17% 
54 STAND.CHART. -2,61% -6,25% 
55 TESCO -4,62% -0,39% 
56 VEDANTA 3,61% -7,14% 
57 VODAFONE GRP. -7,74% -1,90% 
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2. Appendix 2 – Descriptive Statistics 
2.1. Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics for the sample for 2007 
Descriptive Statistics for 2007 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Beta 79 .28 5.36 1.0726 .70428 
Board size 79 6.00 19.00 11.6709 2.69720 
Executive directors 79 1.00 7.00 3.8608 1.44767 
Non-executive directors 79 4.00 16.00 7.8101 2.32090 
Proportion of non-executive 
directors 
79 45.45 88.89 66.6871 10.38710 
Valid N 79     
 
2.2. Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics for the sample for 2010 
Descriptive Statistics for 2010 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Beta 79 .12 8.87 1.1787 1.08541 
Board size 79 5.00 21.00 11.1772 2.68786 
Executive directors 79 1.00 8.00 3.4177 1.38312 
Non-executive directors 79 3.00 15.00 7..7595 2.29947 
Proportion of non-executive 
directors 
79 50.00 90.91 69.1023 10.56093 
Valid N 79     
 
2.3. Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics for the change between 2007 and 2010 
Descriptive Statistics for change N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Change in Beta 79 -.74 8.01 .1062 .90847 
Change in board size 79 -5.00 5.00 .4937 1.90056 
Change in the proportion of  79 -12.78 30.91 2.4153 7.58916 
Valid N 79     
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3. Appendix 3 – Correlations 
3.1. Table 3.1: Correlation between the change in board composition and beta for all 79 
companies 
  Change in Board 
Composition 
Change of Beta 
Change in Board 
Composition 
Pearson Correlation 1.000 -.050 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .663 
N 79.000 79 
Change in Beta Pearson Correlation -.050 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .663  
N 79 79.000 
 
3.2. Table3.2: Correlation between the change in board composition and beta for Cluster 
1 companies 
  Change in Board 
Composition 
Change of Beta 
Change in Board 
Composition 
Pearson Correlation 1.000 .044 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .812 
N 32.000 32 
Change in Beta Pearson Correlation .044 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .812  
N 32 32.000 
 
3.3. Table 3.2: Correlation between the change in board composition and beta for Cluster 
2 companies 
  Change in Board 
Composition 
Change of Beta 
Change in Board 
Composition 
Pearson Correlation 1.000 -.290 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .159 
N 25.000 25 
Change in Beta Pearson Correlation -.290 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .159  
N 25 25.000 
3.4. Table 3.4: Correlation between the change in board composition and beta for Cluster 
1 and Cluster 2 companies together 
  Change in Board 
Composition 
Change of Beta 
Change in Board 
Composition 
Pearson Correlation 1.000 -.090 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .505 
N 57.000 57 
Change in Beta Pearson Correlation -.090 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .505  
N 57 57.000 
 
